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The impact of the IFRS1 9 accounting standard on amplifying procyclical bank 
behaviour has been hotly debated since the introduction of the standard. This paper 
contributes to the debate by a unique simulation, in which we estimated, what 
the losses and capital position of the Hungarian banking system would have been 
during the 2008–2013 crisis episode if at international level subsequently adopted 
IFRS 9 had already been in effect at that time. Our results show that IFRS 9 would 
have led to the recognition of losses, which would have been more concentrated in 
the beginning of this crisis episode, (but not early enough, in the pre-crisis period). 
As a result, the banking system’s aggregated capital adequacy ratio would have 
been more than 20 per cent (2.7 percentage points) lower at the onset of the crisis 
(end of 2008) than it was in reality (9.1 per cent rather than 11.8 per cent). This 
could have forced bank owners to undertake capital increases sooner and in larger 
amounts or to push their banks towards even stronger deleveraging, i.e. towards 
more procyclical behaviour. Our results are in line with the findings in the literature 
that the introduction of IFRS 9 increases the procyclicality of banks’ impairments 
in such a manner that it shifts the recognition of impairments towards beginning 
of crises (but not towards pre-crisis periods!). Although the procyclical effect of 
IFRS 9 demonstrated in our simulation is quite large, this is attributable to the 
special depth and complexity of the 2008 crisis episode in Hungary, which involved 
a sovereign crisis, a banking crisis and a credit crunch at the same time. Thus, our 
results suggest that the procyclical impact of IFRS 9 can be more easily managed 
under ‘normal’ recession circumstances.
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1. Introduction
How would the Hungarian banking system’s accounting losses and capital adequacy 
have evolved if at international level subsequently adopted IFRS 9 accounting 
standard had been introduced before the 2008 crisis? Would Hungarian banks have 
behaved less or more procyclically? Would the probability of bank failures have 
been higher or lower?
These are interesting questions, as the literature usually attributes stronger 
procyclicality2 to banks after the introduction of IFRS 9, and the 2008–2013 crisis 
in Hungary was so severe that if IFRS 9 does indeed have a considerable effect 
in terms of strengthening procyclicality, it would have certainly been felt under 
such circumstances. Therefore, this paper presents a scenario analysis (simulation) 
estimating how impairments would have evolved in the Hungarian banking system 
in 2008–2013 if IFRS 9 had been introduced before the crisis, for example from 
1 January 2007. In doing so, based on the rate of the actual incurred losses, we 
estimate how much impairment banks should have recognised using the expected 
credit loss (ECL) approach of IFRS 9, assuming that their models would have been 
able to accurately predict the actual losses incurred.3 In other words, the simulation 
uses a ‘perfect foresight’ assumption.
The paper is divided into the following sections. Chapter 2 provides an overview 
on why the IFRS 9 standard amplifies banks’ procyclicality. Chapter 3 presents 
the relevant empirical findings in the literature. Chapter 4 briefly describes the 
relevant key features of the Hungarian banking system’s crisis episodes in 2008–
2013. Chapter 5 discusses the main assumptions of the simulation before the 
results are shown in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 lists the imperfections in the simulation’s 
assumptions and how they may distort the results. Finally, Chapter 8 summarises 
the main conclusions.
2. The procyclical features of IFRS 9
At their 2009 meeting, G20 leaders called on international accounting bodies to 
reform the IAS 39 accounting standard for banks’ provisioning based on incurred 
loss introduced in 1984. Although the stated objective of the G20 was to reduce 
the procyclical behaviour of the banking system, there is a general consensus in 
the literature in that the IFRS 9 accounting standard introduced in lieu of IAS 39 
2  There is no universally accepted definition of the procyclicality of banks’ behaviour. In this paper, the 
procyclicality of the banking system means that the behaviour of the banking system continues to heat the 
economy during an expansion in the business cycle, while it causes a deeper recession during contraction. 
The crucial underlying mechanism is that in a crisis, increasing credit losses reduce banks’ available capital, 
which prompts them to curb lending. At the same time, they become even more risk-averse due to the 
losses incurred in the crisis, which leads to an even stronger credit crunch.
3  For more, see Chapter 5 and 7.
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in 2018 increased the procyclicality of banks’ impairment (see, for example: ESRB 
2019; Huizinga – Laeven 2019; Plata Garcia et al. 2017).
The most important novelty in the IFRS 9 standard is the introduction of the ECL 
based estimation of impairment, even for the (performing) portfolio without 
objective evidence of impairment. Under IFRS 9, banks’ financial assets that are 
measured at amortised costs (e.g. loans) are classified into the following three 
categories:
•  Stage 1: assets without evidence of a significant increase in credit risk (SICR) 
since initial recognition. The impairment to be recognised for these equals the 
12-month expected loss of these assets;
•  Stage 2: assets with evidence (e.g. payments 30–90 days past due, rating 
downgrade, restructuring) of a SICR since initial recognition. For these assets, 
impairment equals the lifetime expected loss;
•  Stage 3: assets with objective evidence of incurred losses (e.g. payments over 
90 days past due, other unlikely-to-pay (UTP) events). This category basically 
comprises transactions with objective evidence for incurred losses, for which 
impairment had to be recognised even under the old IAS 39.
Nevertheless, IFRS 9 also requires banks to take into account forward-looking 
information (FLI) when estimating ECL-based impairment. As a result, banks need 
to estimate the point-in-time (PiT) value of expected losses for Stage 1 and Stage 2 
assets, reflecting the current position of the business cycle. This PiT estimate differs 
from the long-term through-the-cycle (TTC) type of parameters used in the internal 
rating-based approach (IRB) approach of the Basel capital requirements. The fact 
that the requirement of IFRS 9 to consider FLI (enforcing the PiT correction) conflicts 
with the prudential approach during an expansion in the business cycle has already 
been pointed out by others (Borio 2018).
Accordingly, the effects of IFRS 9 that amplify procyclicality arise from the following:
•  cyclical volatility in ECL impairment in all Stage 1 and in some Stage 2 assets: 
when the state of the economy deteriorates, the 12-month expected loss values 
in Stage 1 increase in particular, but – to a smaller extent – so does the Stage 2 
lifetime expected loss,4
4  In Stage 2, cyclical volatility is lower, since the PiT correction aligned with the position of the business cycle 
is typically performed by banks for only the first 1–2 years of the given loans’ total maturity, since no reliable 
forecast on the economy’s health is available for farther down the forecast horizon. Therefore, the farther 
points on the forecast horizon are usually calculated with the TTC parameters, without cyclical movements.
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•  due to the deterioration in portfolio quality, some customers migrate from 
Stage 1 to Stage 2 (and of course to Stage 3), where higher provisioning keys are 
assigned to them: of course, migration to the non-performing (Stage 3) category 
was already present in IAS 39, as well, which also caused procyclicality. But the 
possibility of still-performing assets migrating to Stage 2 is a novelty in IFRS 9. 
Since for the same (still performing) loan, the 12-month ECL has to be recognised 
in Stage 1 and the lifetime ECL needs to be recognised in Stage 2, the Stage 2 
impairment may be several times higher than in Stage 1, especially for long-term 
loans.
The change in the procyclicality in banks’ impairment due to IFRS 9 is illustrated 
in Figure 1: it can be seen that the impairment of both Stage 1 and Stage 2 loans 
fluctuates with the business cycle. In fact, when a performing asset suffers SICR 
(significant increase of credit risk since the initial recognition) as a crisis unfolds, it 
must be classified as Stage 2, and an impairment based on lifetime ECL is assigned 
to it, instead of the 12-month ECL.
The fact that impairment exhibits a fluctuation does not in and of itself imply that 
this fluctuation is also procyclical, and indeed, the initial regulatory intention during 
the IFRS 9 introduction was to compel banks to recognise surplus impairment in 
‘good times’. However, this is not facilitated by the IFRS 9 framework, for various 
reasons:
Figure 1
Illustration of procyclicality in IFRS 9
Stage 1 (12-months) ECL
Stage 2 (lifetime) ECL






•  In Stage 1, with the 12-month ECL, potential economic shocks beyond the 
12-month period cannot be taken into account. In other words, even if a bank 
was certain that a deep recession was looming two years down the road, it would 
be unable to incorporate its effect into the 12-month ECL;
•  Although the standard requires banks to calculate expected credit loss as 
a weighted average of several macroeconomic scenarios (at least two), and 
dynamically changing the weighting of the scenarios (increasing the probability 
of a crisis scenario in ‘good times’ and decreasing it in a crisis) provides some 
opportunity for countercyclical behaviour, this has a very limited impact. During 
an expansion, banks need to assign a low weight to the scenarios with a deep 
recession and thus a large increase in impairment, in line with the general 
expectations. Unlike the calculation of capital requirements, IFRS 9 does not allow 
impairment to be calculated along conservative estimates, since the financial 
statements based on it have to reflect a true and fair view rather than a prudential 
one;
•  The criterion for classification into Stage 2 is a significant increase in credit 
risk, which in practice often means payments past due over 30–90 days or 
a deterioration in the debtor’s internal rating. However, these events typically 
occur when a crisis unfolds, rather than in the ‘good times’ before that.5
The procyclical effects of IFRS 9 are mitigated in case of banks that use an IRB 
approach to calculate the capital requirements of their credit risks, because the 
increased impairment during a crisis reduces the so-called IRB shortfall6 at these 
institutions, which in turn improves own funds (see also Háda 2019). This can partly 
offset the profitability-reducing effect of increased impairment, which thus also 
reduces capital. Nonetheless, there is absolutely no such offsetting effect in the 
case of the banks using the Standard Approach (and the financial systems mostly 
consist of such banks).
Therefore, IFRS 9 has several elements that make it likely that the procyclicality of 
banks’ impairment will eventually increase, even if unintentionally.
5  A good example for this is that during the first months of the crisis related to the Covid-19 pandemic that 
unfolded from March 2020, banks’ ratings of corporate credit portfolios improved, since the balance sheet 
ratings were based on the latest balance sheet data from 31 December 2019, and the impact of the crisis 
was often missing from the behaviour information known to banks.
6  Pursuant to Article 159 of the European Capital Requirements Regulation, at banks using the IRB approach, 
the recognised impairment must cover the expected loss of the portfolio (expected loss = PD*LGD). 
Otherwise, an IRB shortfall occurs, which must be deducted from own funds (CET1 capital). However, 
excess provisions can be added to own funds, more specifically Tier 2 capital.
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3. Overview of the literature
Not much time has passed since the introduction of IFRS 9 in 2018, therefore 
the empirical analyses that were first published mostly focused on the effects of 
the introduction itself. They usually showed that the transition to IFRS 9 slightly 
increased banks’ impairments and reduced capital adequacy (for the Hungarian 
banking system, see: Háda 2019 and Csekei et al. 2018). This is not surprising, since 
the impairment to be recognised for performing portfolios (in Stage 1 and partly in 
Stage 2) was a new element in the standard, while the impairment of the Stage 3 
portfolio remained practically the same as under IAS 39.
However, in itself the one-off change in the amount of impairment is irrelevant 
from the perspective of procyclicality, which is determined by the dynamic change 
in impairment levels across years, as this is reflected in banks’ impairment and own 
funds. Moreover, the one-time capital-reducing effects of the IFRS 9 transition are 
probably negligible compared to an additional capital shock that could be expected 
in a potential stress scenario, as demonstrated by Plata Garcia et al. (2017) in 
a simulation for Spanish banks.
The procyclicality of IFRS 9 was proven by Abad and Suarez (2017) with a simulation 
model. Although this was a theoretical model, its parameters were calibrated to 
actual banking data from the euro area. The authors found that IFRS 9 considerably 
increases banks’ profitability in good times, and significantly reduces their capital 
position in times of crisis (thereby substantially increasing the probability of 
recapitalisation). Nevertheless, the authors argued that even if these effects are 
substantial, they can be offset by macroprudential supervisors’ well-calibrated 
countercyclical capital buffers.
Gaffney – McCann (2019) examined the procyclicality of the Stage 2 classification of 
portfolios for Ireland: using a sample of 100,000 Irish mortgages, they estimated the 
share that would have been classified as Stage 2 between 2008 and 2013 if IFRS 9 
had already been in effect at that time. The authors used the transactions’ arrears 
status (31–90 days in arrears) and restructuring status (forborne) and a significant 
increase between the loan’s PD at origination and its current PD re-estimated by 
the authors as triggers for classification as Stage 2. According to their results, the 
share of Stage 2 debtors would have exhibited significant procyclicality: it would 
have increased from 5 to 50 per cent between 2008 and 2012, before falling to 
30 per cent by 2015 (while the proportion of NPLs was never over 20 per cent in this 
period). It should be noted here that more than half of the authors’ Stage 2 debtors 
were classified there based on the rise in their PD, which is a rather speculative 
classification criterion, where banks’ practices may differ widely (in contrast to the 
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other SICR criteria based on arrears for 31–90 days, which is straightforward and 
objective).
In another analysis, the ESRB (2019) compared the results of the ESRB’s 2014, 2016 
and 2018 Stress Tests. They concluded that in the 2018 stress test under the new 
IFRS 9 regime, the simulated losses of banks were more front-loaded to the first 
year of the hypothetical crisis, whereas in the 2014 and 2016 rounds (under the 
old IAS 39 regime), the incurred loss-based impairment was distributed much more 
evenly across the three crisis years.
Finally, an implicit acknowledgement of the excessive procyclicality of IFRS 9 can 
be seen in the fact that European supervisors and the EBA have issued several 
statements and recommendations starting from March 2020, in response to the 
Covid-19 crisis, urging banks to avoid practices leading to excessive procyclicality 
in impairment. Furthermore, the EBA published a recommendation on how banks 
should NOT consider debtors subject to a payment moratorium as restructured, 
which automatically classifies them as Stage 2. A useful overview of these 
measures can be found in Boel – Gringel (2020). On the other hand, the views of 
the same supervisors and the EBA shifted considerably towards the end of 2020: 
from December 2020 or even earlier, they urged credit institutions to recognise 
impairments reflecting the actual risks of the loan portfolios impaired by the 
Covid-19 crisis, instead of mitigating procyclical effects, (for example: EBA 2020; 
ECB 2020). This may suggest that after the initial ‘shock’, procyclicality was not 
considered as a severe risk to financial stability as insufficient provisioning.
All in all, there is consensus in the literature that IFRS 9 increased procyclicality 
in banks’ impairments, although the fact that this was significant or represented 
a threat to financial stability does not seem to be clearly proven (especially in view 
of supervisors’ responses in 2020). Nevertheless, as far as the author is concerned, 
no similar simulation based on data from a real crisis and covering the loss and 
capital adequacy data from the entire banking system has been produced on 
this topic. (In fact, the Covid-19 crisis will still not be fully suitable for testing the 
procyclical effect of IFRS 9, as this crisis was ‘too sudden’, and, as things at the 
time of writing of the study stand, it was followed by a similarly swift recovery: by 
the time it was possible to incorporate the expectations of a fairly deep recession 
in 2020 into banks’ models, the timeframe for forward-looking information had 
already shifted to the ‘bounceback’ forecast for 2021, which did not require as 
extensive a PiT correction of PDs as in a drawn-out recession.)
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4. The situation of the Hungarian banking system in the 2008–2013 
crisis episode
The Hungarian banking system experienced a particularly deep crisis episode in 
2008–2013, making this especially suitable for simulating the procyclical effects of 
IFRS 9. This study does not endeavour to provide a detailed summary of the post-
2008 crisis in the Hungarian banking system, and only the most crucial phenomena 
necessary for the understanding of the topic of the paper are highlighted here in 
brief:
•  classic over-indebtedness crisis: Hungary went into the 2008 crisis as one of the 
most heavily indebted countries in the EU, with its net external debt standing just 
a notch below 50 per cent of GDP. This debt arose from two main sources: the 
over-indebtedness of the state and the excessive and ill-structured indebtedness 
of households via the banking system, mainly in FX (Swiss francs);
•  sovereign debt crisis: accordingly, the drying-up of money markets in 2008 
immediately caused a sovereign debt crisis, reflected in a surge of sovereign risk 
premiums, which forced Hungary to enter into a stand-by arrangement with the 
IMF to avoid state bankruptcy;
•  ‘hidden bank crisis’: the proportion of banks’ non-performing loans peaked over 
20 per cent in the household sector and the corporate sector. Total credit losses, 
including the losses arising from the government’s debtor rescue campaigns7 – 
amounted to close to 100 per cent (!) of the banking sector’s own funds as at the 
end of 2008. Bank failures were avoided only because the owners, typically foreign 
parent banks, kept recapitalising the Hungarian credit institutions concerned at 
roughly the extent and pace of impairment recognition;
•  FX loan crisis: the bulk of household loans were outstanding in a foreign 
currency, mainly Swiss francs, against debtors without currency hedging. Since 
the Hungarian forint depreciated against the Swiss franc by around 60 per cent 
between 2008 and 2012 and the interest on the loans did not decrease despite 
falling CHF-LIBOR due to banks’ unilateral pricing policy, FX debtors experienced 
a shock of a similar extent in their payment instalments.
As a result, the Hungarian banking system was in a difficult position after 2008 
(Figure 2): the impairment recognised based on the incurred credit losses jumped 
from 0.4–0.5 per cent of the balance sheet total before the crisis to around 1.5–
2.5 per cent (a threefold or fivefold increase) between 2009 and 2014. At the same 
time, profitability declined as well: although in 2009 banks were still able to offset 
7  The ‘preferential early repayment’ at the turn of 2011 and 2012 and ‘the holding of financial institutions to 
settlement and forint conversion’ in 2014.
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their increased risk costs by unilaterally raising customer interest rates, the banking 
sector suffered losses for five years in a row between 2010 and 2014. It must also 
be borne in mind that the recognition of impairments on an incurred loss basis 
ultimately proved to be overly pessimistic in the case of Hungarian banks: in the 
years after 2014 the banking system was able to make reversals from the released 
impairment on the recovering NPLs for years, increasing their net income. In this 
sense, the main criticism levelled against the incurred loss-based recognition of 
impairment, namely that the recognition of losses is thus ‘too little, too late’, was 
not true (at least as regards the ‘too little’ part), and in fact in this respect the old 
accounting standard also proved to be overly procyclical in hindsight.
Consistent with the above, the banking system’s capital adequacy position also 
came under pressure (Figure 3): although the capital adequacy ratio almost 
doubled from 11.8 per cent at the end of 2008 to 19.9 per cent at the end of 
2015, this was mainly due to capital injections from the owners (with an effect of 
+10 percentage points between 2008 and 2015). Moreover, the banks also engaged 
in considerable deleveraging, and the capital adequacy-improving effect of this 
amounted to half of the impact of capital increases (around +6 percentage points 
until 2015). Without the capital injections by the owners, the banking system’s 
capital adequacy ratio would have been below 10 per cent at the end of 2015. It also 
Figure 2
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Source: Calculations based on the time series of the data from the sectors supervised by the MNB
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has to be underlined that the system-wide figure conceals the heterogeneity among 
banks: while certain banks proved to be more resilient, others performed below the 
banking system average. It is still certain that several large banks would have been 
unable to keep their capital levels above the minimum requirement without capital 
injections from the parent bank, possibly not even at the price of even more radical 
deleveraging.
Overall, the Hungarian banking system thus experienced a significant deterioration 
in portfolio quality and a related loss of capital in the crisis episode that started in 
2008, which not only prompted it to rein in lending activities in a procyclical manner, 
but would have also led to several bank failures in the absence of capital injections 
from parent banks. In other words, this was a very deep crisis, which is suitable for 
illustrating the procyclical effects of IFRS 9 precisely because it highlights cyclical 
fluctuations.
Figure 3
The Hungarian banking system’s capital adequacy ratio, and the decomposition of the 
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Note: *Impact on net income: mostly impact on net income, the source does not specify other elements; 
** Other effects: mostly the effect of regulatory changes (the introduction of the CRR from 2014)
Source: Time series of the data from the sectors supervised by the MNB; Financial Stability Report, MNB, 




In the simulation, the potential additional procyclicality arising from an imagined 
introduction of IFRS 9 prior to the 2008 crisis is quantified relative to the Hungarian 
accounting standards (HAS) in effect at that time.8 HAS was selected as a basis of 
the comparison, because the available financial reporting of the Hungarian banking 
system was made by HAS (which was very similar to IAS 39).
First, a more detailed summary of the HAS-based regulations in effect at that time 
is necessary. According to HAS, bank assets had to be classified into the categories 
presented in Table 1 based on expected losses (Balás 2009), and the impairment to 
be recognised was the expected credit loss. Nevertheless, in practice banks often 
classified assets into categories based on the number of days in default, especially 
in the household segment, using the following ranges: problem-free (overdue by 
0 or 1–30 days), to be watched (overdue by 31–60 days), substandard (overdue 
by 61–90 days), doubtful (overdue by 91–365 days), bad (overdue by over 1 year). 
(In addition, especially in the mortgage credit segment affected by FX lending, 
certain banks classified the transactions with an increased loan-to-value ratio due 
to exchange rate changes into the ‘to be watched’ category, even if this was not 
standard practice.)
Table 1
Expected loss ranges for the different rating categories based on the Hungarian 
accounting standards in effect in 2009
Category Expected loss
Problem-free 0%




Source: Balás 2009, p. 3.
Although at first glance the HAS approach is also based on ECL, it actually differs 
significantly from IFRS 9 in several respects:
•  no provisioning for problem-free transactions: under HAS, impairment for 
expected credit loss only had to be recognised for transactions with objective 
evidence of probable losses that may not be fully recovered from the collateral.9 
8  These were stipulated in the version of Government Decree No. 250/2000 in effect back then.
9  HAS also allowed collateral to be taken into account: for example in extreme cases, even a long-overdue item 
(clearly classified as Stage 3 under IFRS 9) could be classified as problem-free if it had collateral of exceptional 
quality and sufficient quantity (e.g. cash collateral in custody of the lender). By contrast, under IFRS 9 such 
a transaction would be Stage 3 with low LGD. Of course, this example was not frequent or realistic.
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By contrast, under IFRS 9, for Stage 1 transactions impairment must be recognised 
without objective evidence of a probable loss (in other words for problem-free 
loans);
•  no increase in the customer’s credit risk since origination is taken into account: in 
HAS, only the current ECL counts, taking into consideration not only the probability 
of default (PD), but also loss given default (LGD). For example a customer 
experiencing a major rating downgrade can remain problem-free if there is no 
objective evidence of probable losses (e.g. no late payments);
•  the adjustment based on forward-looking information only affects the non-
problem-free portfolio: since in HAS zero impairment has to be recognised for the 
problem-free portfolio elements, which would be mostly classified as Stage 1 and 
to a lesser extent as Stage 2 under IFRS 9, its cyclical adjustment is not applicable.
The above disparities are more or less in line with the most important differences 
between IFRS 9 and IAS 39.
At the same time, the approach of HAS and IFRS 9 to non-problem-free portfolio 
elements according to HAS (which therefore fall into the ‘to be watched’ category 
or below) is not that different: basically, both standards require impairment to be 
recognised for the transactions overdue by over 30 days,10 and it more or less equals 
the lifetime ECL in both cases. Although HAS did not explicitly require forward-
looking information to be taken into account, its ECL-based approach actually 
included assumptions on the economic environment, even if they were not very 
significant, since expected credit loss was already recognised for the whole lifetime 
of the loan.
Accordingly, beyond the not very frequent exceptions, the basic differences between 
HAS and IFRS 9 would have been due to the fact that the problem-free portfolio is 
assigned a 0-per cent impairment under HAS:
•  some of the problem-free portfolio would have been assigned impairment 
different from zero as Stage 1 under IFRS 9 (12-month ECL),
•  and some of the problem-free portfolio would have been classified as Stage 2, 
with impairment recognised accordingly (based on lifetime ECL).
10  There may be exceptions: IFRS 9 allows banks not to classify transactions overdue by over 30 days as Stage 2 
with proper justification, and under HAS such transactions can remain in the problem-free category with 
strong collateral, but these are just the exceptions.
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In the present simulation, these two effects are quantified retrospectively in the 
three dimensions below:11
1)  Quantification of the impairment on the problem-free customer loan portfolio, 
separately for the portfolios potentially classified as Stage 1 and Stage 2,
2)  The impairment dynamics of the potential classification of sovereign and 
interbank exposures as Stage 2,
3)  The impairment dynamics of the classification of the performing FX loan portfolio 
as Stage 2.
The effects for the entire banking system are estimated separately for the three 
factors above, using the available data. The differences in the situation of individual 
banks cannot be taken into account due to the simulation methodology and lack 
of available data.
5.1. Assumptions for the problem-free customer loan portfolio (without the FX 
loan effect)
Stage 1 problem-free portfolio
Some of the problem-free debtors under HAS in the customer loan portfolio12 would 
have remained in Stage 1 under IFRS 9. For these exposures, banks would have 
had to recognise impairments amounting to the 12-month ECL. To estimate this, 
banks’ actual annual incurred loss relative to total credit as per HAS is established 
as follows:
•  the numerator of the loss ratio is the annual net impairment recognised in the 
banking system’s consolidated profit and loss account. Although this indicator 
could theoretically include losses from other portfolio types, in reality almost 
100 per cent of Hungarian banks’ losses were incurred on the customer loan 
portfolio, and therefore this approach is correct,
•  the denominator of the loss ratio is the annual average gross total of customer 
credit in the banking system.
11  The effects arising from the three dimensions are cumulative on each other in the order presented here, 
because it reflects the probability with which these effects would have contributed to the provisioning 
policies strengthening procyclicality (from the most likely to the least likely).
12  The customer loan portfolio includes households and non-financial corporations. Debtors classified as 
financial corporations are discussed in the next subchapter.
73
Procyclical Effects of IFRS 9 – Illustrated by a Simulation on the Hungarian Banking System
In the simulation, it is assumed that the impairment of the Stage 1 portfolio, the 
12-month ECL, equals in all years the loss rate (loss / total loan volume) actually 
recognised by banks under HAS in the following year. In other words, it is assumed 
that the impairment under HAS measured incurred losses accurately, and that 
with ‘perfect foresight’ banks would have been able to predict the losses for the 
following year based on this. Thanks to this assumption, it is not necessary to 
make speculative assumptions on banks’ scenario planning, while the dynamics 
brought by the forward-looking PiT correction of IFRS 9 into provisioning can be still 
illustrated. (This is useful because the exercise does not seek to run a simple ‘what 
if’ scenario, but also to establish the procyclical dynamics of IFRS 9.) Nevertheless, 
two one-off items resulting from two government interventions are excluded from 
the loss rate used for the simulation: the one-off bank losses recognised due to 
the early repayment scheme at preferential exchange rates in 2011 and the losses 
related to the Settlement Act of 201413, as these cannot be assumed to have been 
foreseen by any bank’s impairment model.
It is important to note that the perfect foresight for the loss path is only assumed 
from 2008, so the crisis unfolding at the end of 2008 takes banks by surprise in the 
simulation. This is a realistic assumption, since this is what actually happened,14 (just 
as the crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic completely took market participants 
by surprise). One of the procyclical effects of IFRS 9 arises precisely from this: 
risk parameters deteriorate rapidly during unexpected crises due to the suddenly 
pessimistic forward-looking information.
For the years where the banking system’s impairment recognised as per HAS 
increased net income (a release occurred), a 12-month ECL of 0.5 per cent, roughly 
equalling the average loss ratio before the 2008 crisis, was assumed.
The annual loss rate estimated in this manner (the forward-looking 12-month ECL) 
can be seen in Figure 4. It clearly shows that in the simulation the IFRS 9 12-month 
ECL jumps at the end of 2008, as the effect of the unexpected crisis is incorporated 
into the forward-looking (PiT) adjustment of the ECL, and then it is smoothed back 
to the ‘normal’ value after the last crisis year of 2013.
13  2014. évi LXXVII. törvény az egyes fogyasztói kölcsönszerződések devizanemének módosulásával és a 
kamatszabályokkal kapcsolatos kérdések rendezéséről (Act 2014 LXXVII on the settlement of questions 
concerning changes in the currency of certain consumer credit agreements and interest rate rules): https://
net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1400077.tv
14  For example the mean of the GDP forecast by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank for 2009 declined by over 
10 percentage points between the publication of the August and December issues of the 2008 Inflation 
Report. A similarly dramatic decline was seen in the expectations of every other player.
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For all years, the impairment in banks’ income statements equals the annual change 
in impairment volume assumed for the Stage 1 portfolio as described above. In 
other words, it is affected not only by the Stage 1 ECL but also by the change in 
volumes. The volume of problem-free Stage 1 loans is estimated by deducting 
the estimate of the problem-free Stage 2 loans from total problem-free loans, as 
described in the next subchapter.
Stage 2 problem-free portfolio
Determining the portion of the portfolio deemed problem-free under HAS to be 
classified as Stage 2 is more challenging. Customers who were restructured or in 
default for 30–90 days during the crisis were mostly classified by banks in the ‘to 
be watched’ category or below in HAS as well, and ECL-based impairment was 
recognised for them. Therefore, the recognition of losses related to them would 
probably have not been much different under IFRS 9. On the other hand, the portion 
of the portfolio recorded as problem-free under HAS without objective default but 
with a significant increase in credit risk relative to the date of borrowing would 
have been classified into Stage 2 under IFRS 9. However, there are no backward-
Figure 4
Recognised annual impairment in the Hungarian banking system relative to total 
customer loans and the 12-month ECL assumed in the simulation for the Stage 1 






















































Loss rate w/o one-offs
12-month ECL rate assumed for Stage 1 portfolio in the simulation
Source: MNB data and calculations based on such
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looking data on this. (The reclassifications related to FX lending are discussed in 
Subchapter 5.3 rather than here.)
Therefore, we estimate the size of the problem-free Stage 2 portfolio by relying 
on a benchmark and utilising the calculations by Gaffney and McCann cited in the 
summary of the literature. They estimated that the share of the Irish mortgage 
loan portfolio to be classified as Stage 2 due to a rating downgrade was roughly 
1.4 times the number of loans that were restructured or in arrears by 30–90 days 
(Gaffney – McCann 2019, Figure 4). Since the situation of the Irish banking system 
after 2008 was very similar to that of Hungary in 2008–2013, this proportion is 
considered a good benchmark.15 However, statistics containing restructured 
transactions in Hungary are not available for the crucial years of 2008–2009, and 
therefore the volumes of loans classified in the ‘to be watched’ and ‘substandard’ 
categories under HAS were used as a substitute for this indicator. This is rational 
since banks were mostly required to classify the restructured transactions in the ‘to 
be watched’ category or below, and the transactions past due by 30–90 days were 
roughly covered in the ‘to be watched’ and ‘substandard’ categories,16 so overall 
there is a substantial overlap between this indicator and the categories of Gaffney 
– McCann. (Nevertheless, the final results of the whole simulation are actually not 
that sensitive to this parameter (Figure 7).)
The ‘problem-free Stage 2’ ratio of the Hungarian customer loan portfolio calculated 
with the above assumptions is shown in Figure 5. If the portfolio classified as Stage 2 
due to the rating downgrade as calculated above is added to the ‘to be watched’ 
and ‘substandard’ portfolios under HAS (which are presumably also Stage 2), it can 
be seen that the proportion of the Hungarian Stage 2 portfolio under IFRS 9 would 
have peaked slightly below 45 per cent during the 2008 crisis episode. This more 
or less tallies with the 50 per cent value estimated by Gaffney – McCann (2019) for 
the Irish mortgage portfolios.
15  In both banking systems, the share of non-performing loans peaked around 20 per cent.
16  Of course, this coverage is not perfect, since as noted above, under HAS the availability of collateral could 
considerably improve or reduce the rating.
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The lifetime ECL of Stage 2 loans is quantified as follows:
•  we assumed the ‘perfect foresight’ already used for Stage 1 transactions. Thus, 
for all loans outstanding at the end of the tth, we apply the loss rates as per HAS 
between t+1 t+5 years. The latter parameters were chosen because the average 
residual maturity of the customer loan portfolio of banks was somewhat over 
4 years in this period,
•  the forward-looking ECL was discounted by the discount factors in line with the 
current interest rate environment,17
•  from 2014, when banks’ HAS impairments started to increase net income due to 
releases, Stage 2 ECL is calculated by interpolation between the value estimated 
for 2013 (the last year in the crisis) and the actual data for average ECL ratios 
according to IFRS 9 in 2018 (the year when IFRS 9 was introduced).
17  The discount factor was calculated by estimating the average customer interest rate (effective interest 
rate). This was done by dividing the banking system’s annual gross interest income by the portfolio of 
performing interest-bearing assets. The discount rate was calculated for the interest rates derived in this 
manner for the first four years.
Figure 5


















































Performing Stage 2, assumption in the simulation
Non-performing (actual)
"To be watched" and "below-average" (actual)
Note: Actual data are from the MNB. * No public data are available since 2015 for the portfolio rating 
categories as per HAS. The values for these were estimated based on the portfolio ratio in arrears for 
90+ days as reported by the MNB.
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The Stage 2 lifetime ECL values thus determined (and the Stage 1 ECL) are shown 
in Figure 6. It can also be seen there that the relative fluctuation of the Stage 2 ECL 
falls short of Stage 1, in line with the discussion in Chapter 2.
The impairment in banks’ income statements is calculated with the annual change 
in the assumed impairment volume for this portfolio segment as well.
Total effect on the problem-free portfolio (Stage 1 + Stage 2)
Based on the above assumptions, the application of IFRS 9 to the problem-free 
portfolio at the end of 2008 would have required significant additional impairments 
as compared to HAS, while in the later crisis years additional releases would have 
been possible (Figure 7). All in all, during the period between 2008 and 2017, 
practically spanning an entire business cycle, impairment would have been the 
same under IFRS 9 as with HAS, because by the end of the period the ECL of the 
problem-free portfolio returned to the non-crisis state, where it had been before 
2008. Figure 7 also shows that additional impairment under IFRS 9 would have been 
influenced more by the ECL related to the portfolio remaining in the problem-free 
Stage 1 category, in other words: by the effect arising from the forward-looking 
Figure 6











































Actual ECL-ratio for Stage 1 after introduction of IFRS 9 in 2018
Assumed ECL-ratio for Stage 2
Actual ECL-ratio for Stage 2 after introduction of IFRS 9 in 2018
Assumed ECL-ratio for Stage 1
Note: Assumed ECL ratios are based on the author’s calculations. Source of the actual data presented 
here: Háda (2019) Figure 6
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adjustment of risk parameters. This would have required provisioning of over 
1 per cent of the banking system’s balance sheet total in 2008 (HUF 320 billion). 
Compared to this, the migration of some of the problem-free portfolio into Stage 2 
would have had a smaller effect, despite the substantial migration ratio (mostly 
because this migration would have taken place more gradually over the crisis years).
Between 2009 and 2011, when the net income-reducing impact of the problem-free 
Stage 2 portfolio is larger, the effect of the additional impairment of this portfolio 
segment exerted on the Gaffney–McCann parameter used for the size of the 
problem-free Stage 2 portfolio is more or less linear: by doubling the factor of 1.4 
applied, which would entail the peaking of the Stage 2 transactions not in arrears 
at roughly 50 per cent of the total portfolio, the net income-reducing effect would 
be also almost doubled.
5.2. Assumptions for sovereign and bank exposures
If IFRS 9 had been introduced prior to 2008, the forward-looking PiT correction 
would have been applicable to the risk parameters of sovereign and bank exposures, 
and the classification of exposures as Stage 2 should also have been considered. 
The latter is true despite the fact that credit institutions usually apply the IFRS 9 
Figure 7
Additional impairment on the customer loan portfolio under IFRS 9 (relative to HAS) 
as a share of the balance sheet total, for the entire banking system (positive/negative 










































Problem-free Stage 1 portfolio
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exemption for the so-called low default portfolios in the case of sovereign and 
sometimes also bank exposures. In other words, these exposures do not have to be 
classified as Stage 2 even if their risk has significantly increased since recognition, 
if remaining still low in absolute terms.
Nonetheless, the financial crisis that began in Hungary in 2008 was coupled with 
a sovereign debt crisis, which caused the government’s risk premiums, such as its 
CDS spread, to spike (Figure 8) from close to zero before 2008 to 600–700 basis 
points. Hungary was repeatedly downgraded by credit rating agencies from 2008, 
and the country fell out of the investment category in 2011. Hungarian banks’ risk 
premiums and their credit ratings, of the few institutions that had these at all, 
deteriorated in parallel with the sovereign rating.
In the face of such significantly and objectively increasing credit risk, it would have 
been difficult to argue against the necessity to classify exposures vis-à-vis the 
Hungarian sovereign and perhaps even Hungarian banks as Stage 2 under IFRS 9. 
Therefore, our simulation also includes an estimation for this scenario.
In this, it is assumed that banks would have classified their Hungarian government 
bonds (in the banking book) as Stage 2 at the end of 2008 (as the surge in CDS 
spreads and the recourse to the IMF package occurred in late 2008), and they would 
have kept them there until the end of 2014. The government bonds in Stage 2 are 
assumed to receive the average 5-year CDS spread for the given year as lifetime 
ECL.18 The basis for government bonds in Stage 1 is the 12-month ECL, which we 
assume to be equal to the average 1-year CDS spread as calculated from the 5-year 
CDS spread.
We have simulated the above impacts only for the sovereign portfolio, but no 
Stage 2 classification effect was quantified for bank exposures. This has several 
reasons: first, since most Hungarian banks had no readily measurable risk price 
indicators, a significant increase in credit risk would have been more difficult to 
establish here. Second, in the part of the banking sector owned by non-residents, 
the increase in credit risk could have been mitigated by the probability of support 
from the parent bank. Third, these bank exposures were also partly collateralised 
(with a low LGD). Furthermore, the amount of interbank loans in the Hungarian 
banking system was not really high (amounting to less than 5 per cent of banks’ 
balance sheet total in 2008), and thus excluding this effect does not influence the 
overall picture.
18  This is an acceptable benchmark as it is certain that the residual maturity of the government securities 
issued by the Hungarian state was around 3.5 years in early 2009 (Bíró – Horváth 2020), however, this 




Of course, classifying the sovereign portfolio as Stage 2 in the simulation is a speculative 
decision, and it can be assumed that banks and the supervisory authority would have 
been eager to avoid this in the given situation. They could have found numerous 
arguments for this: first, the CDS spread shows the credit risk of government exposures 
denominated in FX, which is much greater by nature than the government debt 
denominated in the domestic currency (and Hungarian banks mostly held government 
securities denominated in forint). In addition, the loan arrangement signed with the 
IMF in 2008 also considerably reduced the default risk of the sovereign (although 
in Greece private investors also incurred losses in the end, despite the IMF–EC–ECB 
rescue package). However, when the stipulations in IFRS 9 are taken literally, the default 
risk of the Hungarian sovereign undoubtedly increased significantly in 2008 (along with 
other sovereigns in the EU), so this scenario was realistic.
The impairment in banks’ income statements is calculated with the annual change 
in the assumed impairment volume for the sovereign portfolio segment as well.
Based on the above, the simulated additional impairments under IFRS 9 relative 
to HAS would mainly have been significant in 2008, the year when Hungarian 
government bonds would have been classified to Stage 2 and the rising CDS 
Figure 8
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Note: The data on the 5-year CDS spread are from the MNB’s Financial Stability Report, May 2015, 
Chart 13. The 1-year spread is the author’s estimate.
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spreads would have been first effective (Figure 9). After this, impairment would 
have reflected the dynamics of CDS spreads. Actually, since the price of Hungarian 
government securities was basically determined by the risk premium in this period, 
the introduction of IFRS 9 together with the significant increase in the chance for 
a state bankruptcy would have put the assessment of the banking book government 
bond portfolio on a quasi-mark-to-market basis.
5.3 Assumptions for the problem-free FX loans
During the 2008–2013 Hungarian crisis episode, one of the most important sources 
of the financial system’s vulnerability was undoubtedly the household debt in FX, 
which was mostly denominated in Swiss francs. Since retail FX debtors had no 
natural currency hedge (FX income), the depreciation of the forint, mainly against 
the Swiss franc, that started after 2008 had a substantial negative impact on their 
financial position. As Figure 10 shows, the forint had already lost almost 20 per cent 
of its value against the Swiss franc by late 2008 relative to 2007, and the depreciation 
was over 60 per cent by 2011. In most cases, the repayment instalments of Swiss 
franc debtors increased even more, because banks failed to pass on, through 
customers’ lending rates, the reduction on Swiss franc interest rates that occurred 
at that time, and instead of that, banks made unilateral interest increases.
Although the IFRS 9 standard has no rules related specifically to FX loans, a major 
exchange rate shock affecting the borrower is difficult to interpret in any way other 
than a significant increase in credit risk since recognition, in other words an event 
Figure 9
Additional impairment on the sovereign portfolio under IFRS 9 (relative to HAS) as 
a share of the balance sheet total, for the entire banking system (positive/negative 
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triggering Stage 2 classification under IFRS 9. Although in such a situation banks 
would have definitely tried to separate the borrowers with an appropriately low 
payment-to-income ratio that prevented a substantial impact of the exchange rate 
shock on their financial position, due to the massive size of the shock and the 
loose lending conditions that prevailed prior to 2008, there would probably have 
been only a handful of such cases. Therefore, the simulation used a conservative 
approach and estimated a scenario in which banks would have been forced to 
reclassify all problem-free household FX loans as Stage 2. It is assumed that this 
would have occurred at the end of 2009, since the forint exchange rate had already 
depreciated by 30 per cent during the year relative to the pre-2008 figure, when 
the majority of the Swiss franc loans were originated.
The same assumed Stage 2 ECL is used for quantifying the relevant impairment 
effects as presented in Subchapter 5.1. Although the Stage 2 ECL calculated 
there also contains corporate portfolio data, the distortion arising from this does 
not substantially influence the overall picture, as the NPL ratios and loss ratios 
developed similarly in the household and the corporate portfolios. Regardless 
of the FX effect, the classification as Stage 2 is not duplicated for the loans that 
had already been classified as Stage 2 due to the rating downgrade, as shown in 
Subchapter 5.1, and so no additional impairment is recognised for these due to the 
Stage 2 classification on account of their being denominated in a foreign currency, 
because they were already Stage 2 due to the rating downgrade (and, of course, 
the same goes for non-problem-free FX loans).
Figure 10





























































































































200   
Source: MNB
83
Procyclical Effects of IFRS 9 – Illustrated by a Simulation on the Hungarian Banking System
The impairment in banks’ income statements is calculated with the annual change in 
the assumed impairment volume for the reclassified problem-free FX loans as well.
Accordingly, the simulation shows that the additional Stage 2 classification of the 
household FX loan portfolio, affecting the portion not already classified as Stage 2 
due to the rating downgrade and other indicators, would have mainly caused 
a major one-off loss to Hungarian banks in 2009 (Figure 11), the year when the 
reclassification would have occurred. After this, the impairment of this portfolio 
segment would have been determined by the PiT corrections based on forward-
looking information as applied to lifetime ECL (as shown in Subchapter 5.1).
6. Results of the simulation
The results of the simulation are presented by layering the above three effects 
upon each other, as their partial effect on annual impairments has already been 
illustrated on separate figures above. When calculating the combined impact, 
first only the effect of the impairments for the Stage 1 and Stage 2 problem-free 
loans is estimated (because this is the least country- and position-specific, it simply 
results from the logic of IFRS 9). After this, the effects of the reclassification of the 
sovereign portfolio as Stage 2 are quantified, and then the classification of the FX 
loan portfolio as Stage 2 is added to that.
Figure 11
Additional impairment on the household FX loan portfolio under IFRS 9 (relative to 
HAS) as a share of the balance sheet total, for the entire banking system (positive/








































Impact of classifying all performing FX-loans into Stage 2
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The results of the simulation corroborate the findings in the literature: if IFRS 9 had 
been introduced in Hungary prior to the 2008–2013 crisis episode, the banking 
system’s losses and recapitalisation needs would have been more front-loaded, 
materialising mostly during the onset of the crisis in 2008–2009. The more factors 
are taken into account, the more pronounced this effect is.
In themselves, the PiT-corrected Stage 1 impairment for problem-free customer 
loans and reclassification of some of the problem-free customers as Stage 2 exert 
the greatest impact: this would have been enough to reduce the strong pre-tax 
profits of the banking sector in 2008 to zero (Figure 13). In exchange, banks’ losses 
would have been smaller in 2011–2014. It is important to see that the introduction 
of IFRS 9 would not have affected the amount of banks’ actual total credit losses 
over the whole economic cycle, only the distribution over time of the recognition 
and reversal (!) of the losses.
If the IFRS 9 effects simulated for the problem-free customer loans is supplemented 
with the classification of sovereign exposures to Stage 2, the losses to be booked 
in 2008 would have been even more dramatic (Figure 12), making 2008, the eve of 
the crisis, the year with the greatest losses during the entire crisis episode. Added 
to this, the reclassification of all the problem-free FX loans as Stage 2 would have 
resulted in only a minor increase in losses, mostly in 2009, which would have been 
followed by steadily diminishing reversals distributed over the following years.
Figure 12
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It should be noted that when the effects of all three simulated factors are taken into 
account, the application of IFRS 9 would have completely transformed the dynamics 
of the banking system’s profitability. In reality (under HAS), after a final strong year 
in 2008, banks’ profits declined practically continuously until 2014, but if IFRS 9 had 
already been applied, they would probably have experienced improving profitability 
following a huge loss in 2008. It cannot be ruled out that this latter scenario, i.e. 
the quicker recognition of losses, would have had a more positive effect on banks’ 
willingness to lend.
On the other hand, the introduction of IFRS 9 would have placed the banking 
system’s capital adequacy under great pressure much sooner: the simulation shows 
that, ceteris paribus, the sector-wide 11.8-per cent capital adequacy ratio in 2008 
would have diminished by 23 per cent (2.7 percentage points) to 9.1 per cent 
(Figure 14) if IFRS 9 had applied. If banks’ owners had wished to maintain the same 
capital adequacy level until 2011 as in reality under HAS, they would have had to 
implement a capital increase amounting to 2.5–3.0 per cent of the banking system’s 
risk-weighted assets (RWA) in 2008. This would have amounted to HUF 600 billion, 
roughly a quarter of the actual own funds of the banking system in 2008 or about 
2 per cent of Hungary’s GDP back then, in other words it would have been a massive 
amount. In the absence of this, banks would have been required to make stronger 
deleveraging efforts. 
Figure 13
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All in all, the owners of the banks in need of a capital injection would have had much 
less time to prepare for the losses and arrange the capital increases. This would have 
entailed the risk that Hungarian banks respond to the emerging situation by even 
more deleveraging, which, by definition, would have been even more procyclical 
behaviour. Had IFRS 9 been introduced, the banking groups in the region would have 
been faced with a similar (though maybe less severe) situation in several countries 
at the same time, and in extreme cases this would have jeopardised certain regional 
banking groups’ ability or willingness to recapitalise their subsidiaries.
Admittedly, however, macroprudential supervision has come a long way since 2008, 
and almost at the same time when IFRS 9 was introduced, countercyclical elements 
appeared in regulation that were not available to supervisors in 2008, such as the 
countercyclical capital buffer and the capital conservation buffer. In this context, 
the 2.7-percentage point decrease in the capital adequacy ratio simulated for the 
IFRS 9 introduction in 2008 does not seem that bad. Most of it could have been 
offset by an adequately calibrated countercyclical capital buffer (if the buffer would 
have been at its maximum of 2.5 per cent on the eve of the crisis, and then it 
would have been immediately reduced to zero by supervisors). In other words, 
macroprudential supervisors would have been able to offset the procyclical effects 
of IFRS 9, although this would have also meant that the buffer could no longer be 
used to encourage actual countercyclical bank behaviour, only to neutralise the 
immediate capital effects of the new accounting standard.
Figure 14
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7. Assumptions influencing the results
There are several factors that make it likely that in reality the procyclical effects of 
IFRS 9 would have been more muted than presented here:
•  More optimistic expectations instead of perfect foresight: since the deterioration 
in banks’ portfolio quality was a gradual, protracted process after 2008 (the 
volume of NPLs only peaked in 2012–2013), the expectations would only have 
caught up with the worsening situation later. This is all the more likely as the 
deterioration of certain economic indicators, especially the CHF/HUF rate, which 
is key from the perspective of FX loans, reached numerous historic highs, and 
most analysts did not expect this. It is therefore not unrealistic to assume that 
in reality banks would have calculated the forward-looking ECL of Stage 1 and 
Stage 2 portfolios with more optimistic parameters than what actually occurred, 
especially because they would have been interested in doing so. And due to the 
lack of earlier experience from crises of such magnitude, it would have been 
difficult to quantify the development of actual credit risk.
•  Supervisory interventions: just as in present Covid-19 crisis, regulatory bodies 
would have had strong incentives at their disposal to prevent the use of loss 
estimates for accounting purposes that would have endangered financial stability. 
In this manner, they would probably have been able to prevent the classification 
of the entire FX loan portfolio and sovereign exposures as Stage 2, even if this had 
run counter to the spirit and expectations of the IFRS 9 standard.
All in all, it can be assumed that the authorities and market participants would 
have tried to make use of the large leeway in the estimation of ECL due to IFRS 9 
to mitigate procyclical effects. 
8. Conclusions
This analysis examined how much stronger procyclical effects would have been 
exerted on the Hungarian banking system during the crisis episode of 2008–2013 
if the IFRS 9 standard based on expected credit loss had been introduced before 
that. The simple simulation model prepared for this showed that, in line with the 
findings in the literature, the recognition of the Hungarian banking system’s losses 
during the crisis would have been much more front-loaded and occurred in 2008 
or 2009 if IFRS 9 had been applied. In parallel with this, banks’ capital adequacy 
would have sustained a major shock of over 20 per cent (−2.7 percentage points) 
at the end of 2008, the eve of the crisis. To restore this, bank owners would have 
been forced to make relatively large capital injections amounting to 2 per cent of 




Overall, the analysis confirmed the perception that IFRS 9 increased bank 
impairment relative to the earlier rules, while making the dynamics of impairments 
more procyclical. In reality and in this simulation as well, this is because under 
IFRS 9 the impairment of Stage 1 and Stage 2 transactions has to be aligned with 
the current state of the economy (point-in-time correction), and the transactions 
with an increased risk since recognition that are nevertheless performing are to 
be classified as Stage 2; all of this front-loads the recognition of losses at the onset 
of a crisis. Meanwhile, the standard does not provide banks a proper opportunity 
to offset this by establishing more impairments in the ‘good times’ to prepare for 
a crisis.
It also has to be underlined that although the reduction in capital resulting from the 
simulation seems to be very large, it tends to suggest that the procyclical effects of 
IFRS 9 are manageable. First, the 2008–2013 Hungarian crisis episode was extreme 
by any standard, compounded by a balance of payments crisis, a sovereign debt 
crisis and an FX debt crisis. Under ‘normal’ recession circumstances, the procyclical 
effect of the standard may also be more subdued. Second, the instruments of 
macroprudential supervisors have expanded considerably since 2008, with the 
addition of tools (countercyclical capital buffer, capital conservation buffer) which 
– if used wisely – may have been able to neutralise the major procyclical effects 
seen in the simulation. However, it must also be added that the primary objective of 
introducing these instruments was to offset banks’ inherent procyclical behaviour, 
rather than to neutralise the procyclical accounting effects that did not exist before 
IFRS 9. This increased the complexity of the aspects to be taken into account by 
supervisors.
Therefore, in the future, supervisors need to pay more attention to managing the 
procyclical effects arising from banks’ recognition of losses, and signs of this can 
already be seen in the current crisis related to Covid-19.
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